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Los norteamericanos hablan el ingl6s.
Les Am6ricains parlent anglais.
Americans speak English.
This simple statement, which represents a patriotic impera-
tive' for some Americans and a simple declaration of measurable ob-
servation for others,2 potentially plays havoc with products liability
warning law. Products liability law, a byproduct of both common and
statutory law, has developed state by state in a crazy quilt pattern
across the country; although the states are virtually unanimous on
broad doctrines, they have taken a Balkanized approach to details. 3
Today, every jurisdiction recognizes that product manufacturers and
sellers have a duty to warn consumers and users adequately of the
inherent dangers associated with their products.4  This recognition,
however, does not obscure the utter confusion regarding adequate
warning requirements.5 Most warning cases revolve around this con-
fusion, which has become a doctrinal morass that is detrimental both
to the growing number of Americans who speak English poorly and to
the entrepreneurs who market to them.
On a societal level, the statement "Americans speak English" is
perhaps best understood as a tautology. This view implies that people
who do not speak English* are not Americans.6 The tautology, how-
l. See notes 67, 81-84 and accompanying text.
2. Nearly 199 million Americans, 86% of those counted in the 1990 Census, speak English
at home. 1990 Census of Population and Housing, Summary Social, Economic and Housing
Characteristics, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1990 CPH-5-1, 15 ("1990 Census").
3. See notes 23-45 and accompanying text (describing the development of products liability
law and the influence of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965)).
4. See Part II.
5. The definition of warning adequacy has generated a small mountain of scholarship. See
generally James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1512 (1992); Michael S. Jacobs, Toward a
Process-Based Approach to Failure to Warn Law, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 121 (1992); W. Page Keeton,
Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 Tex. L. Rev. 398 (1970); John W. Wade, On
Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 551 (1980).
6. This general insistence on lingual purity runs contrary, however, to the American story.
See John Elson, The Great Migration, Time, Special Issue: The New Face of America 28-33 (Fall
1993). For a thorough discussion of the history of language and the law in the United States, see
generally Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural
Pluralism and Official English, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 269 (1992). Perea notes that each wave of
American immigration has challenged the previous cultural, political, economic, social, and
linguistic order, frequently resulting in the formation of communities within, but culturally
distinct from, the larger surrounding communities. Id. at 332-36. The factors determining
whether immigrants preserve their original language and develop a subculture or assimilate into
the English-speaking culture are varied, including political, social, demographic, cultural, and
linguistic reasons. Jean Molesky, Understanding the American Linguistic Mosaic: A Historical
Overview of Language Maintenance and Language Shift, in Sandra Lee McKay and Sau-ling
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ever, ignores twentieth-century American statistics: more than thirty-
one million Americans do not speak English at home.7 More than ten
percent of the citizens of seventeen states, which contain nearly half of
the United States' total population, speak a language other than
English at home.8 If all the Americans who speak Spanish at home
lived in a single state, it would be the third most populous state in the
country.9 In many of the largest cities in the United States, more
than twenty percent of the population does not speak English at
home, or at all.1° These statistics explain why non-English newspa-
pers, television stations, and radio stations comprise a rapidly growing
market for readers and advertisers."
Cynthia Wang eds., Language Diversity: Problem or Resource 32-33 (Newbury House, 1988). For
a recent study of the difficulties nonwhite immigrants face in assimilating, see generally
Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its
Variants, 530 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 74 (1993).
7. The 1990 Census counted 31,844,979 Americans who speak one of 298 languages other
than English at home. Nearly 199 million Americans speak English as a first language. The most
popular languages, after English, with the number who speak them at home in parentheses, are
as follows: Spanish or Spanish Creole (17,345,064), French or French Creole (1,930,404), German
(1,547,987), Chinese (1,319,462), and Italian (1,308,648). 1990 Census of Population and Housing
Summary Tape File 3C. The Census Bureau counted 170 Native North American languages
spoken by approximately 330,000 individuals. Id. Language barriers suggest these Census
estimates are low, due to the inability of non-English-speaking persons to complete Census
questionnaires. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Census, Statistics and Postal Personnel of
the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 10 Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 7, 1993)
(statement of Harry A. Scarr, acting director, Bureau of the Census) (available from LEXIS,
NEWS library, CURNWS file). See also U.S. Department of Commerce, Decision of the Secretary
of Commerce on Whether a Statistical Adjustment of the 1990 Census Should Be Made for
Coverage Deficiencies Resulting in an Overcount or Undercount of the Population, 56 Fed. Reg.
33582 (1991) (statement by Secretary Robert Mosbacher that the 1990 Census failed to count 1.6%
of all Americans and 5.2% of Hispanics).
8. In seven states, more than twenty percent of the population speaks a non-English
language: Arizona, California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Texas. In ten
other states, at least ten percent of the population speaks a language other than English: Alaska,
Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Nevada, and Rhode Island. 1990 Census at 1990 CPH-5-1 (cited in note 2). For a list of states
with at least a five-percent bilingual population, including major languages spoken in each state,
see Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic Groups from Jury
Service, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 761 (appendix).
9. Only California, with 29,760,021 people, and New York, with 17,990,455, would have
more people. 1990 Census at 1990 CPH-5-1, 2 (cited in note 2).
10. Laredo, Texas is the least English-literate metropolitan area in the nation. Of the
area's 119,740 persons age five and older, 110,183-an astonishing 92%-do not speak English at
home. Nearly 50% of the community reports it "does not speak English very well." 1990 Census
at 1990 CPH-5-15 (cited in note 2). Other metropolitan areas, including Miami, Fla., El Paso and
McAllen, Tex.; and Las Cruces, N.M., also report non-English-speaking populations in excess of
50% of their total population. Id. at 1990-CPH-5-9, 16-17. Many other metropolitan areas have
non-English-speaking populations exceeding 20%.
11. Major-market, English-language newspapers, struggling with declining advertising
revenues, have begun Spanish-language supplements and editions, including La Estrella (Fort
Worth, Texas Star-Telegram); La Raza's Domingo (Chicago Sun-Times); Exito (Chicago Tribune);
Nuestro Tiempo (L.A. Times); Las Noticias (Denver, Colo., Rocky Mountain News); El Nuevo
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Nonetheless, the tautology and its corollary have survived in
the public consciousness and have great potential to impact the law.
All Americans, at least those who speak English, are entitled to sig-
nificant legal privileges and rights, including many that are constitu-
tionally or statutorily based and others that derive from common-law
doctrines. Although statutes and constitutional doctrine 2 are begin-
ning to reflect the reality that many people in the United States do
not speak English, the common law has developed more slowly.
13
Thus, the common law fails to answer the following questions ade-
quately: Must a manufacturer warn consumers in every language
spoken by Americans? 4 How should a manufacturer put someone who
does not understand English on notice if the warning is written in
English? Is someone who does not speak English even entitled to
American rights, remedies, privileges, or any warning at all?' 5
This Note examines the problems associated with the duty-to-
warn doctrine and the non-English-speaking consumer or product
user. Part II explains the current duty-to-warn doctrine, emphasizing
when a warning is required, to whom the warning must be directed,
and how the warning must be given. Next, Part III examines state
and federal language-specific statutes, constitutional provisions, and
case holdings, emphasizing the most recent cases addressing product
warning requirements for non-English-speaking plaintiffs. Part IV
then outlines the risks to both product sellers' 6 and consumers of
Tiempo (Santa Barbara, Cal., News-Press); El Sol (Idaho Falls Post-Register); and El Nuevo
Herald (Miami Herald). These editions, and others, reach what will be the largest ethnic minority
in the United States by 2010. Laura Castenada, Matter of Interpretation: Star-Telegram to
Publish Spanish Edition, Fort Worth Star-Telegram 1D (Feb. 2, 1994). A Spanish-language
newspaper supplement, Vista, reaches 1.1 million readers in 37 U.S. markets. Christy Fisher,
Read All About It: Market Gets Papers, Advertising Age S-10 (Jan. 24, 1994).
Non-English newspapers are far behind the electronic media, however, in market share and
advertising clout. In Los Angeles and San Antonio, Spanish-language radio stations are the top-
rated stations in their markets. In the McAllen-Brownsville-Harlingen, Texas, market, three
Spanish-language radio stations attract more than 25% of the area's radio listeners. Susen Taras,
Hispanic Radio Heats Up the Airwaves; Latino Stations "Better Promoted, Better Researched,
Better Executed," Advertising Age S-8 (Jan. 24, 1994). Four of eight low-power television stations
in Orlando, Fla., brodcast in Spanish. Rene Stutzman, "Everyone" Targeting Hispanics, Orlando
Sentinel 15 (Jan. 17, 1994). The Telemundo television network, which broadcasts exclusively in
Spanish, reaches 85.4% of the Latino households in 53 U.S. markets. News Release, Telemundo
Group Inc. (Feb. 3, 1994) (available in NEXIS, NEWS library, CURNWS file).
12. See notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
13. See Part III.
14. See Part IV.
15. Recent feminist and critical-race legal scholarship has captured this sense of disenfran-
chisement in storytelling. See, for example, Victoria Guest, St. Landry Loan Company v. Avie, 14
Harv. Women's L. J. 327 (1991) (imagining the experiences of a French-speaking Creole man in
1962 New Orleans).
16. This Note uses the terms "product seller" and "product manufacturer" interchangeably
because strict products liability law does not differentiate between the two. For a discussion of
[47:1107
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continuing the current haphazard approach and suggests a statutory
solution to the doctrinal confusion, drawing from the jurisdictional
tenet of purposeful availment. Finally, Part V argues that traditional
understandings of language and the law are no longer accurate, call-
ing on legislatures and courts to adopt the doctrinal approach sug-
gested in Part IV.
II. THE DUTY TO WARN AND CONSUMER CAPABILITY
The duty to warn consumers of product dangers originated in
the common law as a tortious action in commercial misrepresentation. 17
As contract law doctrines of the late nineteenth century developed,
however, courts began to perceive an express promise of product
safety as an element of the seller's consideration, voluntarily ex-
changed rather than societally prescribed, for a premium on the
buyer's price.18 Under this view, the parties defined their liabilities by
private negotiations confirming their respective expectations. 19
By grounding the seller's warranty in contract law, courts could
enforce strict liability if the seller breached.20 Three new problems
emerged, however. If the product lacked the promised quality, result-
ing in physical harm to the buyer, courts could not compensate the
injured consumer because contractual privity between the consumer
and the responsible party often was missing.21 Perhaps even more
important, contract law allowed the seller to shape his potential liabil-
this principle's rationale, see Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168, 171-
72 (1964). Pending federal legislation differentiates between manufacturers and sellers, pre-
empting state strict liability law to the extent that sellers are held to a simple negligence stan-
dard in products liability cases. Product Liability Fairness Act S.687: Report of the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, [CCH Special 1] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
36-39 (Dec. 27, 1993).
17. See J.B. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1888). The early cases
only involved express warranties. Ford Motor Co. v. London, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240
(1966), and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402B (1965) are modern statements of the commer-
cial misrepresentation doctrine.
18. See Arthur Linton Corbin, 1 Corbin on Contracts § 1.14 (West, Rev. ed. 1993).
19. The accuracy of this view is debatable. Compare id. at § 1.1 with Samuel Williston, 1
Williston on Contracts § 1.1 (Lawyers Co-op., 4th ed. 1990).
20. Strict liability always has been a feature of contract law. E. Allan Farnsworth, United
States Contract Law 174 (Transnat'l Juris, 1991).
21. Privity was frustrated in two ways. Manufacturers could shield themselves by promis-
ing quality or safety and then marketing the product through independent, mid-level distributors
or retailers. The English case of Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842), led American
courts to adopt this doctrine. See Francis H. Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the
Law of Torts, 53 Am. L. Rev. 209, 280-85, 289-310 (1905) (arguing that U.S. courts misinterpreted
Winterbottom to allow manufacturers to avoid liability). Privity also was broken if the injured
party was merely a consumer or user of the product and not the actual purchaser.
1994] 1111
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ity unilaterally through his promise. Furthermore, under the popular
freedom-of-contract rubric of the time, a party was not deemed to have
promised what he had not promised in writing or clear oral agree-
ment.22
A. The Emergence of the Duty to Warn in Tort Law
Solutions emerged in, and were forced by, the embryonic con-
sumer economy of the early twentieth century. For the first time,
courts recognized implied warranties of product safety, whether or not
sellers provided any express warranties. 23 Unlike express promises
made between parties to a contract, these implied promises, which
were imposed on every transaction, rendered privity irrelevant.24
Courts acknowledged that a cause of action for a seller's failure to
notify a consumer of a product's risks most closely resembled an action
in tort. Nonetheless, some contractual features, most notably strict
liability, remained.25
22. If the seller did not want to warn someone about a product danger, he was only required
to do so if pressed by the buyer, who was likely ignorant of all of the product's attendant dangers.
See notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
23. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913). Mazetti involved the sale of
spoiled beef tongue that was represented to be "pure and wholesome and fit for food." Id. at 633.
In holding the seller liable, the court found that when "the rule [of liability] does not rest upon
any principle of contract, or contractual relation existing between the person delivering the
article and the person injured .... there is no contract or contractual relation between them." Id.
at 634 (citation omitted). The Mazetti court further noted that the unequal position of food
packagers and consumers required the imposition of an implied warranty:
The wholesaler, the retailer, and the user of these goods, whether in the capacity of ca-
terer, seller, or host, sustain an entirely different duty, respecting a knowledge of their
contents and quality, than prevails with regard to knowing the quality of those food prod-
ucts which are open to the inspection of the seller or victualer. With reference to these it
may well be considered ... that, having an opportunity to know... the quality of their
merchandise, [product sellers] are charged with a responsibility amounting to a practical
guaranty.
Id. at 635.
Mazetti came three years before Judge Cardozo's famous opinion in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), which eliminated the privity requirement in cases
of faulty design or manufacturing in New York. "We have put the source of the obligation where
it ought to be. We have put its source in the law." Id.
24. Courts have compared the product seller's implied warranties to the implied covenants
that run with the land in sales of real property. Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss.
876, 111 S. 305, 307 (1927).
25. Though products liability today is grounded firmly in tort law, two states recognize
failure-to-warn claims only as breaches of implied or express warranties. See Cline v. Prowler
Indus. of Maryland, Inc., 418 A.2d 968, 976 (Del. 1980); Bay State-Spray & Provincetown
Steamship, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 404 Mass. 103, 533 N.E.2d 1350, 1354 (1989). See also
Bly v. Otis Elevator Co., 713 F.2d 1040, 1045 n.6 (4th Cir. 1983) (interpreting Virginia's warranty
theory to be the "functional equivalent" of strict liability). For a history of the development of
implied warranties in products liability law, see generally William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon
the Citadel, 69 Yale L. J. 1099 (1960).
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By blending traditional negligence concepts of societal duty
with contract law's strict liability, the doctrinal dissonance of these
decisions gave rise to a potent remedy for consumers who were igno-
rant of a product's dangers.2 6 This remedy was adopted in Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965).27 In a widely ac-
cepted statement of law that commentators have likened to "holy
writ,"28 courts have read Section 402A to extend the strict liability
approach developed in the early warnings cases to all products liabil-
ity actions, including actions for flaws in design,29 manufacturing,30
and warnings.3' The comments accompanying Section 402A, although
Three states base failure-to-warn cases only on the negligence of the product seller. See
Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 S.2d 134, 138-39 (Ala. 1976) (adopting most of Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) but rejecting its no-fault foundation); Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346
N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 1984); Buck v. Tweetsie Railroad, Inc., 44 N.C. App. 588, 261 S.E.2d 517,
519 (1979). Virginia also recognizes failure-to-warn claims in negligence. Bly, 713 F.2d at 1044.
26. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), offers one of the
earliest, and best, explanations of the policies undergirding implied causes of action.
27. Section 402A, entitled 'Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer," reads as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
28. Professors Henderson and Twerski found at least 3000 cases citing § 402A. Henderson
and Twerski, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1512 n.1 (cited in note 5).
29. See, for example, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963);
Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 300, 298 N.E.2d 622 (1973). See generally Wade, 33 Vand. L. Rev.
551 (cited in note 5). Dean Wade was the reporter for the Restatement (Second) during the
drafting of Section 402A. But compare James T. O'Reilly, Product Defects and Hazards:
Litigation and Regulatory Strategies §§ 4.3-4.4 (Wiley Law Pub., 1987) (suggesting that other
sections of the Restatement (Second), namely Section 398, indicate that the drafters actually
intended a negligence standard for defective design cases and that such a standard would be
preferable to strict liability); Henderson and Twerski, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1531 (cited in note 5)
(citing cases and arguing that a risk-utility test should replace strict liability in design cases in
the upcoming Restatement (Third) of Torts). The ideas of Henderson and Twerski should be
compared to Wade's ideas for at least one reason: Henderson and Twerski have been appointed
Reporters for the products liability sections of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, now underway.
Id. at 1513.
30. See, for example, Hall v. Chrysler Corp., 526 F.2d 350, 352 (5th Cir. 1976); Wiseman v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 29 Wash. App. 883, 631 P.2d 976, 980 (1981). See John W. Wade, On
the Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L. J. 825, 841 (1973).
31. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. j (1965). For cases adopting the
Restatement approach, see Hill v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 1989)
(applying Arkansas law); Rohrbaugh v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 965 F.2d 844, 846 (10th
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rejecting the implied warranty doctrine as a legal fiction,32 nonetheless
adopt the doctrine's trappings in failure-to-warn cases by stating that
liability flows from a manufacturer's failure to include directions or
warnings on products that are more dangerous than the ordinary
consumer would contemplate, regardless of the manufacturer's care in
designing or manufacturing the product.33
Cir. 1992) (applying Oklahoma law); Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 453-54 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Snawder v. Cohen, 749 F. Supp. 1473, 1479 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (applying Kentucky law); Prince v.
Parachutes, Inc., 685 P.2d 83, 87 (Alaska 1984); Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 136 Ariz. 556, 667
P.2d 750, 754 (1983); Ontai v. Straub Clinic and Hosp., Inc., 66 Haw. 237, 659 P.2d 734, 739
(1983); Rojas v. Lindsey Mfg. Co., 108 Idaho 590, 701 P.2d 210, 212 (1985); Lamkin v. Towner, 138
Ill. 2d 510, 563 N.E.2d 449, 457 (1990); Duggan v. Hallmark Pool Mfg. Co., 398 N.W.2d 175, 177
(Iowa 1986); Hill v. AirShields, Inc., 721 S.W.2d 112, 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Streich v. Hilton-
Davis, 214 Mont. 44, 692 P.2d 440, 444 (1984); Rahmig v. Mosely Machine Co., 226 Neb. 423, 412
N.W.2d 56, 69 (1987); Fyssakis v. UNX Chem., Inc., 108 Nev. Adv. Op. 40, 826 P.2d 570, 571
(1992); Thibeault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843, 850 (1978); Jones v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 100 N.M. 268, 669 P.2d 744, 747 (1983); Codling v. Paglia, 32
N.Y.2d 300, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628 (1973); Dauphin Deposit Bank and Trust Co. v. Toyota Motor
Corp., 408 Pa. Super. 256, 596 A.2d 845 (1991); Castriginano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546
A.2d 775, 779 (R.I. 1988); Jahnig v. Coisman, 283 N.W.2d 557, 560 (S.D. 1979); Evridge v.
American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 685 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tenn. 1985); Brune v. Brown-Forman
Corp., 758 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Menard v. Newhall, 135 Vt. 53, 373 A.2d 505, 506
(1977); Ayers v. Johnson Baby Prods. Co., 117 Wash. 2d 747, 818 P.2d 1337, 1345 (1991); Vincer v.
Esther Williams All Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 330, 230 N.W.2d 794, 797 (1975);
Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334,341 (Wyo. 1986).
For cases critical of Section 402A's approach to warnings, see the cases cited in note 25;
Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 162 W. Va. 857, 253 S.E.2d 666, 680 (1979). See also
Gordon v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182, 1189 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 to failure-to-warn cases); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 421 Mich.
670, 365 N.W.2d 176, 180-86 (1984) (rejecting strict products liability in favor of a risk-utility
balancing test, but noting that, under Michigan law, actions in negligence and breach of implied
warranty require identical proof). See James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal
Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 265, 271-
289 (1990) (urging a rejection of Section 402A's strict liability approach in warning cases).
For a sample of state statutes adopting Section 402A's approach, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-
572q (West 1991); Ind. Code § 33-1-1.5-1 et seq. (1988); Pattern Instructions for Kansas (Second) §
1305 (Supp. 1992) (Civil); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.57 (West 1989); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14,
§ 221 (West 1980); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-4 (West 1987); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-1415-1418 (Michie
Repl. 1992); N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01.1-05() (1991); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2307.73(A)(1),
2307.76 (Page 1991); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.920(3) (1979); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-73.10 to -30 (Law. Co-
Op. 1976).
32. Comment m criticizes the warranty doctrine on the privity issue, stating that the lack of
a contract between the injured consumer and the party with the duty to warn may thwart
recovery. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. m (1965). But see text accompanying notes
23-26.
33. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. i (1965). This concept is known as the
consumer-expectations" test, and most states have adopted it either by judicial decision or
statute. See, for example, Prince v. Parachutes, Inc., 685 P.2d 83, 88 (Alaska 1984); La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 9:2800.57.B() (West 1989); Henderson and Twerski, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1533 n. 25 (cited
in note 5). Georgia applies a manufacturer's expectations test in warnings cases, enforcing a duty
to warn only when the manufacturer reasonably believes the product may cause harm. See, for
example, Weatherby v. Honda Motor Co., 195 Ga. App. 169, 393 S.E.2d 64, 66 (1990).
Henderson and Twerski recommend replacing the "open-ended and unstructured" consumer
expectations test with a risk-utility analysis akin to Judge Learned Hand's B<PL calculation in
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). Henderson and Twerski, 77
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Similar to the early implied warranty cases, society's expecta-
tions, rather than the contractual expectations of the parties or the
unilateral belief of one party, now establish the seller's duty. Whether
the jurisdiction applies the consumer-expectations test embodied in
comment i or the risk-utility analysis suggested in comment j to define
the scope of the duty, all of the Section 402A and implied warranty
jurisdictions have reached a common ground: Consumers deserve to
know if products they buy and use daily carry unexpected risks of
harm.34 Therefore, manufacturers and sellers who fail in their duty to
relieve consumer ignorance of these hidden dangers face, in the words
of Section 402A's title, "special liability."
B. Adequacy: The Restatement's Silence
The Restatement, however, provides little guidance to courts
and legislatures to determine what a warning should say and how a
warning should be stated.35  Thus, legislatures and courts are left
without any help when determining warning requirements; their
Cornell L. Rev. at 1532-34 (cited in note 12). Hand's formula multiplied the probability of harm
(P) by the extent of the actual harm (L) and compared it to the burden necessary to avoid the
harm in the first place (B). Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173. Henderson and Twerski would
consider consumer expectations as only one factor in determining whether the risks posed by the
product outweigh the utility of the warning under the Restatement (Third) version of Section
402A. They claim this is in keeping with Dean Wade's own understanding in Wade, 44 Miss. L. J.
at 837-38 (cited in note 30). Henderson and Twerski, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1533 n. 27 (cited in
note 5).
34. The debate between consumer-expectations and risk-utility analyses occupies much of
the current duty-to-warn literature and legislative consideration. See Henderson and Twerski, 77
Cornell L. Rev. at 1532-34 (cited in note 5); Henderson and Twerski, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 296-303
(cited in note 31); James B. Sales, Product Liability Law in Texas, 23 Houston L. Rev. 1, 64-68
(1986). A full critique of the debate is beyond the scope of this Note. Further, under the solution
outlined in Part IV, the application of either analysis will result in liability for failure to warn a
non-English-speaking consumer in her own language assuming similar case facts.
35. The comments to Section 402A do not describe the requirements of a warning. They
also say little about how the lack of a warning causes a plaintiffs injury, except that a "seller may
reasonably assume [a warning] will be read and heeded." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A
cmt. j (1965). A majority of courts hold that a plaintiff is entitled to a presumption that she would
have read a warning if given one. See, for example, Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532
P.2d 1377, 1382 (Okla. 1974); Butz v. Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509, 517 (N.D. 1989); Technical Chein.
Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972). Under this view, causation is hardly a factor in
duty-to-warn cases. Some courts allow defendants to prove that a plaintiffs conduct was not, or
could not be, influenced by an appropriate warning. John S. Allee, Product Liability § 7.05[2] nn.
11-12.1 (L. J. Seminars, 1993).
Henderson and Twerski would require plaintiffs to prove that the lack of an adequate
warning proximately caused their injuries. This requirement imposes the difficult burden of
proving a supposition "that, if an adequate instruction or warning had been supplied, use and
consumption would have been altered so as to reduce or eliminate the plaintiffs injury."
Henderson and Twerski, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1522 (cited in note 5).
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watchword has become adequacy.3 6 An adequate warning must iden-
tify both the scope of the attendant danger and the seriousness of the
harm that could result from foreseeable misuse of the product. 37
Adequate warnings allow consumers to make informed choices about
the risks they will incur by using the product.33 They prominently and
clearly communicate the pertinent risks, effectively informing society
of the product's dangers39 Finally, adequate warnings protect each
buyer's safety by emphasizing the product's dangers to that buyer.40
This latter requirement is the foundation of the adequacy test.
No matter the typeface, color of print, or choice of language, if con-
sumers are not able to grasp the warning's meaning, then they are
unable to make an informed analysis of the risks they might encoun-
ter by using the product.41 Hence, a manufacturer's failure to satisfy
36. A~lee, Product Liability at § 4.05 (cited in note 35); Adequate and Inadequate Warnings,
2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 30,401 (Mar. 1993). See, for example, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-1418
(Michie 1992 Repl.) (listing requirements of legally adequate warnings for jury instructions); Shell
Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 581 P.2d 271, 279 (1978).
37. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-4 (West 1987). La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:2800.53(9) (West
1989) defines "adequate warning" as "a warning or instruction that would lead an ordinary
reasonable user or handler of the product to contemplate the danger in using or handling the
product and whether to decline to use or handle the product in such a manner as to avoid the
damage for which the claim is made."
38. A famous example of a warning message that failed to satisfy this requirement is the
asbestos manufacturer's label at issue in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076
(5th Cir. 1973). The full warning read as follows: "This product contains asbestos fiber.
Inhalation of asbestos in excessive quantities over long periods of time may be harmful." Id. at
1104. In finding the warning inadequate, the court said: "It should be noted that none of these
so-called 'cautions' intimated the gravity of the risk: the danger of a fatal illness caused by
asbestosis and mesothelioma and other cancers. The mild suggestion that inhalation of asbestos
in excessive quantities over a long period of time 'may be harmful' conveys no idea of the extent of
the danger." Id. (emphasis in original). See Nature of HazardlSeverity of Risk, 2 Prod. Liab. Rep.
(CCH) 30,403 (Mar. 1993). Dean Keeton believed this consumer-empowering function was at
the heart of the warning requirement and argued for strict liability enforcement. Keeton, 48 Tex.
L. Rev. at 411 (cited in note 5). This approach also offers an effective rejoinder to those who argue
that warnings merely drive up the costs of production and add little to overall safety that experi-
ence in the marketplace would not otherwise correct. Richard A. Epstein, Modern Products
Liability Law 95 (Quorum, 1980). Duty-to-warn law, in fact, serves an important information-dis-
tribution function by allowing the unfortunate experience of one consumer to result in the
protection of others similarly situated. See W. Kip Vicusi, Wading Through the Muddle of Risk-
Utility Analysis, 39 Am. U. L. Rev. 601, 601-02 (1990).
39. See, for example, Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d
868, 872-73 ('ex. Ct. App. 1974). Adequate and Inadequate Warnings, 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
30,401 (Mar. 1993).
40. Adequate and Inadequate Warnings, 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 30,401 at 55, 208 (Mar.
1993). See, for example, Henry v. Crook, 195 N.Y.S. 642, 643 (1922); Ziglar v. E. I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 53 N.C. App. 147, 280 S.E.2d 510, 516 (1981); Evridge v. American Honda Motor
Co., Inc., 685 S.W.2d 632,636 (Tenn. 1985).
41. "If the warning is going to have any effect whatsoever on behavior, people must be able
to understand it.... Manufacturers have a legal duty to communicate all that they know, or
ought to know, about the risks of using their products in ways that all, and not just a select group
of, foreseeable users can understand." Clear Communication, 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCI) 30,402
(Mar. 1993) (emphasis in original).
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this bottom-line requirement impairs all three critical functions of an
adequate warning-consumer empowerment, information spreading,
and societal protection.
C. Adequacy and Capability/Status-Affected Consumers
Courts have addressed this issue in a set of cases that may be
grouped under a rubric of capability-status questions. In these situ-
ations, courts are faced with consumer-plaintiffs whose ability to
understand the meaning of a warning is affected by their status as a
minor, an illiterate, a physically challenged individual,42 or a non-
English-speaking American.43 From a product seller's perspective,
these cases also threaten to open the floodgates of litigation and in-
crease the costs of products." Without some limit on a manufacturer's
duty, particularly under a strict liability regime, entrepreneurs pre-
paring to enter the marketplace would have to spend hours formulat-
ing warnings that would satisfy every group of capability-affected
consumers.45  Hence, courts must consider the interests of both capa-
bility-affected consumers and product manufacturers.
42. No reported case has considered the issues implicated by blind consumers. For a
discussion of adequacy issues involving consumers physically challenged by their age, see Jacobs,
71 N.C. L. Rev. at 154 n.137 (cited in note 5). Compare Nassif v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 731
F. Supp. 1422, 1425-26 (S.D. Iowa 1990) (holding that a manufacturer had no duty to warn
persons with sensory defects of the "open and obvious dangers" of putting their feet too close to a
portable space heater).
43. These issues do not differ conceptually from the sophisticated or knowledgeable-user de-
fense available in most states. See Allee, Product Liability at § 4.0411] (listing cases discussing
knowledgeable-user defense) (cited in note 35). Under this defense, the manufacturer may assert
that the subjective knowledge of the product user is sufficient to render a warning mere surplus-
age. The defense usually is applied to professionals or others with special expertise. It is
generally not available to sellers of consumer products on the open market. Id.
The capability-status cases offer the reverse of the sophisticated-user defense, but with
doctrinal similarities. Both theories shape a manufacturer's duty by consideration of the skills
and know-how of the product's foreseeable consumers; both rely on a subjective examination of
the particular plaintiff before the court to determine if she is sophisticated or illiterate; and both
are distinct from the open and obvious doctrine, which is based on an objective analysis to
determine whether a product hazard is obvious to all, thus relieving the manufacturer of its duty
to warn of that hazard. See, for example, Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 760 (D.C. 1989)
(holding that a handgun manufacturer has no duty to warn of dangers of criminal misuse because
the danger is obvious). See Allee, Product Liability at § 4.05[4] (listing cases discussing open and
obvious doctrine) (cited in note 35).
44. The consumer-expectations test outlined in comment i to Section 402A recognizes the
perspective of the ordinary consumer. Consideration of consumer capability, an issue not
addressed by the Restatement (Second), requires the manufacturer to consider extraordinary
consumers.
45. Savvy manufacturers and sellers already target their marketing toward groups that
might be considered extraordinary consumers, particularly non-English-speaking consumers. For
the business that finds its products in the hands of a Tagalog-speaking individual in the Midwest,
however, a foreseeability requirement has real meaning.
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Courts that have analyzed these questions frequently rule for
the plaintiffs. When presented with compelling facts, the plaintiffs
capabilities, and the manufacturer's ability to foresee the danger,
courts generally have prevented a product manufacturer from using a
plaintiffs status against him.
1. Evridge v. American Honda Motor Company
A paradigm case concerning capability-affected consumers is
Evridge v. American Honda Motor Company,4 in which a six-year-old
girl rode on the back of a Honda Express motorbike operated by a
nine-year-old neighbor. As she rode, her foot slipped and was trapped
between the rear wheel and the hot exhaust pipe. She suffered third
degree burns47 The motorbike had two decals cautioning that only
the operator should ride the motorbike.4 The owner's manual, which
neither the two children nor their parents ever saw because the boy's
family bought the bike used, contained a statement that only one
person should ride the bike and a separate warning that the exhaust
pipe becomes extremely hot during operation.49 Neither the girl nor
her parents saw the decals on the motorbike or the owner's manualY'
Seeking affirmation of a summary judgment order, Honda
argued that the warnings were sufficient as a matter of law. 51 With
little discussion, the court affirmed the long-standing principle 52 that
46. 685 S.W.2d 632 (Tenn. 1985).
47. Id. at 634.
48. A decal on the headlight, which was visible only to the operator, read "WARNING.
OPERATOR ONLY. NO PASSENGERS." Id. On the oil tank under the luggage rack behind the
seat, another decal read "CAUTION. VEHICLE CAPACITY LOAD: 180 lbs. (82 Kg) OPERATOR
ONLY." Id.
49. On the inside front cover, the owner's manual contained the following: "IMPORTANT
NOTICE. OPERATOR ONLY. NO PASSENGERS. This motorcycle is designed and constructed
as an operator only model. The seating configuration does not safety [sic] permit the carrying of a
passenger. Do not exceed the vehicle capacity load limit shown on the tire information label." Id.
Another item later in the manual, under the headline "WARNING," stated: "Exhaust pipe and
muffler become very hot during operation and remain sufficiently hot to inflict burns if touched..
.. " Id.
50. Id. at 635.
51. Id. at 636. Honda also argued that the girl's actions in riding the Express constituted
.an intervening cause sufficient to relieve [Honda] of liability, assuming liability would otherwise
exist." Id. at 635. The court, however, held that the child's actions were foreseeable, given the
motorbike's design and that other children in the neighborhood also had "doubled" their friends
on Honda Express motorbikes. Id.
52. The court cited Henry v. Crook, a case in which a fireworks manufacturer was held
liable for failure to warn children of the dangers of playing with sparklers. A child's dress caught
fire from one of the flying sparks, burning her severely. Henry v. Crook, 195 N.Y.S. 642, 643
(1922). The package contained the following message: "The sparks are harmless. Do not touch
glowing wire. Safe and sane.... A harmless and delightful amusement for children. Are known
the world over as cold fire." Id. at 642. The trial judge's instructions, upheld by the New York
Supreme Court, stated, "[lit is for you to say whether, in describing this instrument as a perfectly
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an adequate warning must be calculated to 'bring home to" a reason-
ably prudent user- of the product the nature and the extent of the
danger involved.54 The court held that Honda was required to account
for the fact that the Honda Express was designed for children's use in
formulating its warnings.55 The supreme court, therefore, reversed
the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for trial on
the merits under the child-warning standard.5
2. Ziglar v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.
In Ziglar v. E.L Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,5 the issue was not
the plaintiffs minority, but her illiteracy. Mrs. Ziglar, a tobacco farm
laborer who never learned to read or write, watched her boss take a
drink from a mason jar of clear liquid that sat on the bed of a pickup
truck next to some paper cups and another container of clear liquid.
Mrs. Ziglar then took a drink from the other container. The jar from
which the farmer drank held water; the container from which Mrs.
Ziglar drank held a colorless and toxic pesticide. She died the same
day.5
The container from which Mrs. Ziglar drank was the original
pesticide container that had been bought that morning from a local
hardware store. 59 The front panel label contained the words "Danger-
Poison" in red letters about one-sixth of an inch high and a red skull-
harmless instrument, and whether saying Do not touch the glowing wire' is enough. Ought not
children, and the parents of children, to be told more?" Id. at 644.
53. "We also cannot say it was not foreseeable that a nine-year-old child would fail to heed
the warnings." Evridge, 685 S.W.2d at 636.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 637. See also Suchomacz v. Hummel Chem. Co., 524 F.2d 19, 28-29 (3d Cir. 1975).
For cases holding manufacturers of disposable lighters liable for failing to design warnings with
foreseeable child users in mind, see Todd v. Societe Bic, 991 F.2d 1334 (7th Cir. 1993), vacated,
reh'g granted, 991 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1993); Bean v. BIC Corp., 597 S.2d 1350 (Ala. 1992).
Compare Wilson v. Good Humor Corp., 757 F.2d 293, 1305-08 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (requiring a street
vendor to warn children of the 'peculiar risk" of buying ice cream from a truck stopped on a busy
highway).
56. The decision was four to one. The lone dissenting justice filed a three paragraph
opinion stating that he believed Honda's warnings were sufficient as a matter of law. Evridge,
685 S.W.2d at 637 (Fones, J., dissenting).
57. 53 N.C. App. 147,280 S.E.2d 510 (1981).
58. 280 S.E.2d at 512.
59. Du Pont manufactured the pesticide and packaged it in one-gallon jugs similar in
appearance to plastic milk jugs. Id. The hardware store was also a defendant in the action,
though the appeals court held it was entitled to summary judgment because it was not negligent.
Id. at 515. North Carolina does not enforce strict liability in duty-to-warn cases. See the cases
cited in note 25.
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and-crossbones symbol slightly less than a quarter-inch square.60 The
back panel contained antidote and first-aid information and repeated
the poison warning with the small skull-and-crossbones symbol.8'
Reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of Du Pont, the appeals court held that the warnings were inadequate
for two reasons. 2 First, the court held that the skull-and-crossbones
symbol on the label was too small.0 The court also said that Du Pont
must account for the fact that farm laborers like Mrs. Ziglar are fore-
seeably illiterate.64 The court reversed the summary judgment order
in Du Pont's favor and remanded the case.65
Courts' concerns for warning adequacy and consumer capabil-
ity or status have led to their refusal to grant manufacturers sum-
mary judgment. These same concerns become even more important
when considering shifting demographics and prejudice. A common
example is the plaintiff who buys a product that has a warning
printed in English only but cannot read or speak English. To protect
these people adequately, legislatures and appellate courts must take
stronger actions than remanding cases.
60. Ziglar, 280 S.E.2d at 512. According to the description in the case, the skull-and-
crossbones symbol would be about one-eighth of the size of an average postage stamp.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 516.
63. Id.
64. "[l]t should not have been unforeseeable to Du Pont that [the insecticide] would be used
in close proximity to farm laborers, who might be illiterate, since it intended the insecticide 'to be
used mainly as a spray or transplant water treatment' on tobacco, which is generally known to be
a labor-intensive crop." Id. The pesticide also had a "distinct odor like rotten eggs," but the court
held that the odor was not sufficient, as a matter of law, to inform farm laborers of the attendant
dangers of drinking the clear liquid. Id. at 519.
65. Id. But see Thomas v. Clairol, Inc., 583 S.2d 108 (La. App. 1991), in which an illiterate
plaintiff suffered a severe allergic reaction to a hair dye. The plaintiff alleged that Clairol's
warnings of possible allergic reaction to the dye were inadequate because the manufacturer could
foresee that "illiterate people in small country towns who could not read the instructions" would
buy the product. At trial, the court awarded a $1000 judgment to the plaintiff. Id. at 110.
Thomas's counsel, however, made two significant trial errors in the judgment of the appeals
court. First, he did not show the court how the manufacturer alternatively could have conveyed
the warnings. Id. Second, he gave no evidence of use of the hair dye by illiterates. "Miie had the
burden to show the use by illiterates was sufficient that defendant should have foreseen it and
provided additional warnings or other safety precautions." Id. at 111. The appeals court reversed
the trial court and dismissed Thomas's suit, but it clearly held the door open for a well-proven
case to establish the relevancy of a plaintiffs illiteracy in warnings cases.
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III. LANGUAGE, LAW, AND LIABILITY
A. Official English Versus Bilingualism in Public Policy
A legal tug-of-war match is currently underway over language
law and policy in the United States. At one end of the rope, state
legislatures and Congress are pulling for a broad range of statutory
and regulatory provisions that recognize the growing non-English-
speaking population in the United States.6 6 At the other end of the
political rope, members of Congress, along with many of the same
state legislatures that passed multilingual laws, are pulling equally
hard for the establishment of English as an official language.67
Arizona requires lenders to notify borrowers of their terms in
Spanish68 and requires process servers to provide notice of legal
actions in Spanish.69 Maine requires the Secretary of State to prepare
election ballots in French.70 Hawaii's constitution acknowledges both
English and Hawaiian as official languages .71 New Jersey requires
any retailer who regularly uses a language other than English in the
ordinary course of business to provide a notice of consumer warranty
66. See generally Bill Piatt, iOnly English?: Law and Language Policy in the United States
37-144 (Univ. of N.M., 1990). Piatt follows a survey of state-law non-English notice requirements
with an argument for a constitutional right to speak one's chosen language. Piatt argues that
laws depriving people of the right to speak the language of their choice destroy an important link
between language and culture. Id. For this and other reasons, Piatt says monolingual laws
amount to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. For a review of Piatt's book and
criticism of his proposal, see Rachel F. Moran, Irritation and Intrigue: The Intricacies of
Language Rights and Language Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 790 (1991).
67. Efforts to amend the Constitution with an "official English" provision have failed in
Congress, despite strong support from some current and former members. See The English
Language Amendment: Hearing on S.J. Res. 167 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 11 (statement of Sen. Denton), 15
(statement of Sen. Huddleston), 53 (statement of former Sen. Hayakawa, co-founder, U.S.
English) (1984).
At least 17 states have established English as their official language by statute or constitu-
tional amendment. For a list of relevant state provisions, see Piatt, jOnly English? at 31-32 (cited
in note 66). In 1990, a federal district court declared Arizona's English-only amendment unconsti-
tutional. Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990). Ironically, only four states with
English-only provisions-California, Florida, Colorado, and Illinois-have non-English-speaking
populations comprising more than ten percent of their states' populations. 1990 Census at CPH-
5-1 (cited in note 2).
68. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6-651 (West Supp. 1993).
69. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2406 (West 1982).
70. Title 21-A Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 603(5) (1993). More than 81,000 citizens of Maine
speak French at home, including approximately 25% of the population of Lewiston, Maine. 1990
Census at 1990 CPH-5-1, 15 (cited in note 2).
71. Hawaii Const., Art. XV, § 4.
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rights in both English and the other language in its advertising.72 The
Illinois legislature instructed state health clinics to provide women a
pamphlet written in Spanish explaining obstetrical health issues.7 3
Pennsylvania's controversial abortion regulations require women
seeking abortions to receive a notice of adoption possibilities printed in
English, Spanish, and Vietnamese7 4 Congress considered the rights of
non-English-speaking Americans in Section 203 of the Voting Rights
Act,7 5 mandating that a state provide assistance to non-English-liter-
ate voters under certain circumstances. 6
In many cases, these provisions reflect simple demographic
reality.7 7 Other laws respecting languages other than English, how-
ever, serve broader purposes, such as the law creating the Council for
Development of French in Louisiana.7 8 These provisions and others
like them7 share a principle common to the adequacy concept in prod-
ucts liability law. That is, when individuals need to be notified of
state or private actions implicating their legal rights and obligations
72. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:16C-61.6 (d) (West 1984). Compare Cal. Civil Code § 1689.7 (West
Supp. 1993) (requiring home-solicitation contracts to be written in the same language as the oral
sales presentation leading to the contract).
73. I. Rev. Stat. ch. 20 § 2310/55.66(a) (West 1993).
74. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3208 (a) (Purdon 1993).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la (1993).
76. Congress re-authorized Section 203 in 1992, extending it for fifteen years, but altered
its triggering mechanisms. Voting Rights Language Assistance Act of 1992, H. Rep. No. 102-655,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 766. The law requires non-English
voting materials and assistance if at least 10,000 persons or five percent of a state or political
subdivision's citizens of voting age are members of a "single-language minority and are limited-
English proficient." The bilingual assistance requirement also is triggered when "the illiteracy
rate of the citizens in the language minority as a group is higher than the national illiteracy rate."
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(b)(2)(A).
77. In each of the previously mentioned states, at least ten percent of the population speaks
a language other than English at home. 1990 Census at CPH-5-1 (cited in note 2).
78. "Said council is empowered to do any and all things necessary to accomplish the
development, utilization and preservation of the French language as found in the state of
Louisiana for the cultural, economic and tourist benefit of the state." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25:651
(West 1989) (emphasis added). See also La. Const. Art. XII, § 4 (protecting Louisianans' right to
preserve their "linguistic and cultural origins"). See also R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-5.1-1 (1992 Supp.)
(affirming "the right of every resident to nurture his or her native language" and stating that "[i]f
Rhode Island is to prosper in foreign trade and international exchange, it must have citizens that
are multilingual and multicultural"). For a discussion of the law's treatment of Louisiana's unique
Acadian population, see generally James Harvey Domengeaux, Comment, Native-Born Acadians
and the Equality Ideal, 46 La. L. Rev. 1151 (1986).
79. See Perea, 77 Minn. L. Rev. at 309-27 (cited in note 6) (discussing the history of
language-specific provisions in Pennsylvania, California, New Mexico, and Louisiana). See also
Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 863 P.2d 167, 174-75 (1993) (listing language-specific
California statutes); Title III, H.R. 965, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 18, 1993) (proposing bilingual
warning labels on buckets to prevent infant drowning as part of the Child Safety Protection Act).
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or significantly affecting their health and welfare, the notice is ineffec-
tive if the receiver of that information cannot understand it. °
Spurred by reports of rising illegal immigration, an economic
downturn in the early 1990s,8' and perhaps most pointedly, accounts
of a 1993 United States citizenship ceremony conducted primarily in
Spanish,82 the English-only advocates re-invigorated their argument
in 1993.3 Proposed Congressional findings attached to the Language
in Government Act of 1993 summarize the objective premises of the
English-only argument that English, as the historical common lan-
guage of the United States, serves as a common thread that binds
citizens from different cultures, and is necessary to preserve unity in
multiculturalism.84
B. Products Liability and Non-English-Speaking Consumers: A
Wavering Approach
The common law falls somewhere between the two ends of the
tug-of-war rope. This tension between subjective and objective under-
standing is readily apparent in the courts' struggles with products
liability warning cases involving non-English-speaking plaintiffs.
80. For an argument that courts should take increased notice of parties' subjective experi-
ences when pluralist values are implicated in a case, see generally Barbara J. Flagg, The Algebra
of Pluralism: Subjective Experience as a Constitutional Variable, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 273 (1994).
81. Bruce W. Nelan, Not Quite So Welcome Anymore, Time, Special Issue: The New Face of
America 10-12 (Fall 1993).
82. Seventy-six immigrants, all Hispanic, took part in the bilingual ceremony administered
by U.S. District Judge Alfredo Marquez of Tucson, Arizona. The actual citizenship oath was
administered in English. One of the grateful new citizens stated after the ceremony: "I can
understand more. I feel more emotion [in Spanish) than in English." New U.S. Citizens Take
Oath in Controversial Ceremony, L.A. Times A23 (July 3, 1993). See also Citizenship Ceremony in
Spanish Enrages English-Only Advocates, Chicago Trib. 6 (July 4, 1993); Whatever Happened to
the English Rite?, Ariz. Republic C5 (July 4, 1993). See S. 1678, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 23,
1993) (proposing that 'public ceremonies for the admission of new citizens shall be conducted
solely in English).
83. Eighty-eight members of the House of Representatives sponsored a bill to make English
the 'official language of the Government of the United States." Language of Government Act of
1993, H.R. 123, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 8, 1993). The Act's scope falls short of previous
constitutional amendment efforts because it would not regulate private conduct, requiring only
that 'the Government shall conduct its official business in English." Id. at § 3(a). The Act
exempts 'actions or documents that protect the public health or safety" and "actions that protect
the rights of victims of crimes or criminal defendants" and "shall not preempt any law of any
State." Id.
84. Those findings include the following: "[T]o prevent division along linguistic lines, the
United States should maintain a language common to all people; [and] [t]hat English has
historically been the common language and the language of opportunity in the United States...."
Language of Government Act of 1993 at § 2(a) (cited in note 83).
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1. Hubbard-Hall, Campos, and Twenty-five Years of Silence
In the first reported case to confront this issue, Hubbard-Hall
Chemical Company v. Silverman,15 two migrant farm workers, natives
of Puerto Rico, dusted crops with a toxic pesticide, Parathion.
Although the Parathion was sold in packages carrying warning labels
approved by the United States Department of Agriculture,m the labels
were of little value to the farm workers, who were functionally illiter-
ate in English.87 One morning, the farm workers dusted with the
Parathion without wearing the protective gear recommended by the
warning label. By nightfall, they had died from the poison. A jury
found Hubbard-Hall negligent and liable for the deaths based on a
failure-to-warn theory.m
On review, the First Circuit held that Hubbard-Hall should
have foreseen that its admittedly dangerous product would be used by
farm laborers who were either illiterate or unable to speak English.89
Considering Parathion's use by non-English-reading persons to be
foreseeable, the court held that the warnings were inadequate" and
that Hubbard-Hall should have added pictograms, such as a large
skull-and-crossbones symbol, that would have communicated
Parathion's danger to the non-English-literate consumer.9'
85. 340 F.2d 402 (lst Cir. 1965).
86. The First Circuit summarily rejected Hubbard-Hall's argument that its warning was
sufficient as a matter of law because it had been approved by the U.S.D.A.. "Neither Congress
nor the Department explicitly or implicitly provided that the Department's approval of the label
carried with it as a corollary the proposition that defendant had met the possibly higher standard
of due care imposed by the common law of torts. ... " Id. at 405. This approach was rejected by
the California Supreme Court's recent reliance on provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act to limit a nonprescription drug manufacturer's duty to warn non-English-speaking
consumers. See text accompanying notes 109-131.
87. Hubbard-Hall, 340 F.2d at 403. The label read:
CAUTION: May Be Fatal if Swallowed, Inhaled or Absorbed Through Skin. Rapidly
Absorbed Through Skin. Do not get in eyes or on skin. Wear natural rubber gloves, pro.
tective clothing and goggles.... Wear a mask or respirator of a type passed by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture for parathion protection.
Id. Hubbard-Hall, the Parathion manufacturer, obtained registration of the label as required
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 et seq.
(1993). Hubbard-Hall, 340 F.2d at 403.
88. Hubbard-Hall, 340 F.2d at 404-05. Hubbard-Hall was decided in January, 1965. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts and § 402A's push for strict products liability were not published
until later that same year.
89. Hubbard-Hall, 340 F.2d at 405.
90. Id. The trial court had charged the jury "[a]n adequate warning... is one calculated to
bring home to a reasonably prudent person, a reasonably prudent user of the product, the nature
and extent of the danger of the product involved." Id. at 404. Compare Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A cmt. j (1965).
91. Hubbard-Hall, 340 F.2d at 405. The American National Standards Institute, in con-
junction with FMC Corp., has developed standards for effective pictograms. See Standard
Warning Label Elements, 2 Prod. Liab Rep. (CCH) 30,419 at 55,216-18 (Mar. 1993). For
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Hubbard-Halrs emphasis on the non-English-speaking abilities
of its plaintiffs went judicially unnoticed for nearly twenty years until
Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Company.92 Armondo Campos,
Portuguese by birth, worked for a truck-trailer manufacturer assem-
bling tires, a procedure so dangerous it was performed inside a cage to
safeguard workers if the tire rim exploded under air pressure.93
Campos noticed one day that a locking mechanism on a rim was open-
ing as a tube inflated. Firestone, the rim manufacturer, had provided
Campos's employer with a warning sign cautioning of this occur-
rence. 94 But Campos could neither read nor write Portuguese or
English; he was incapable of reading the instructions. As Campos
reached into the cage to lock the rim shut, the rim exploded under the
air pressure, severely injuring him5 Campos sued Firestone under
New Jersey's strict products liability law and won a jury verdict of
$255,000.96
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court had no difficulty
holding that Firestone had a duty to warn those employees who as-
sembled tire rims.9 7  The question was whether, given Campos's
English illiteracy, Firestone's warnings were adequate. The court
held the warnings were not adequate due to the foreseeable number of
unskilled or semi-skilled workers, who often cannot read English.
Campos suggests that in such a case manufacturers should use warn-
ings in the form of symbols.9 8
examples of warning pictograms, see FMC Corporation Product Safety Sign and Label System, 2
Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCR) 30,425 at 55,224-25 (Mar. 1993).
92. 98 N.J. 198, 485 A.2d 305 (1984).
93. 485 A.2d at 307.
94. The warning sign read: "ALWAYS INFLATE TIRE IN SAFETY CAGE OR USE A
PORTABLE LOCK RING GUARD. USE A CLIP-ON TYPE AIR CHUCK WITH REMOTE
VALVE SO OPERATOR CAN STAND CLEAR DURING TIRE INFLATION." Id.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration prepared the warning for Firestone and
other tire rim manufacturers to distribute. Id. Campos does not say whether the government's
imprimatur on the warning had any bearing on its adequacy.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 308.
97. Id. at310.
98. Id. The court's finding of an inadequate warning failed to sustain Campos's judgment
because the court held the trial court had not charged the jury properly on the issue of causation.
The Supreme Court remanded for a new trial, adopting the causation standard Henderson and
Twerski now advocates for inclusion in of the Restatement (Third) of Torts' version of § 402A. Id.
at 312. See note 35 and Aaron D. Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and
Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts,
57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 521,562 (1982) for a description of Henderson and Twerski's proposal.
Henderson and Twerski would require a plaintiff to prove that the lack of an adequate
warning proximately caused her injury. This requirement imposes the difficult burden of proving
"that, if an adequate instruction or warning had been supplied, use and consumption would have
been altered so as to reduce or eliminate the plaintiffs injury." Henderson and Twerski, 77
Cornell L. Rev. at 1522 (cited in note 5).
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Neither Campos nor Hubbard-Hall alone sufficiently stands for
the proposition that product sellers have a duty to warn consumers in
a language they subjectively understand. These two cases, however,
lay important groundwork. Both cases incorporate the concern for
consumer status and capability into their reasoning. Both question
the adequacy of product warnings based on their inability to keep
intended or foreseeable users of the product from harm. Both examine
the functions of an adequate warning. Neither, however, squarely
addresses the issue of adequately warning non-English-literate con-
sumers.
2. Stanley Industries v. W.M. Barr & Co.: Non-English Warnings
Held Inadequate as Matter of Law
The task of determining the adequacy of English warnings fell
to the court in Stanley Industries v. W.M. Barr & Company,99 the first
case to hold that English-only warnings are insufficient as a matter of
law when a foreseeable plaintiff does not speak English. Stanley
Industries involved two brothers from Nicaragua who worked for
Stanley Industries. After using linseed oil to rub down a table, the
men stowed their oil-soaked rags improperly, causing the rags to
spontaneously combust, which led to a fire that damaged the Stanley
plant.1°° The container in which the linseed oil was stored bore a label
warning users of the possibility of spontaneous combustion. The
warning, however, was written only in English with no pictograms or
symbols.10' The Nicaraguans could not understand it.12
Prior to the fire, both the linseed oil manufacturer and the
retail store where the Nicaraguans' employer had purchased the oil
had engaged in a joint programc°3 to promote certain products, includ-
ing the linseed oil, to south Florida's sizeable Spanish-speaking popu-
99. 784 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
100. Id. at 1572.
101. The warning was under a heading that read "KEEP OUT OF REACH OF CHILDREN."
Id.
102. "One of the brothers cannot read or comprehend English. The other could read words
written on the English language label but had difficulty understanding their meaning. Both
employees testified they would have sought more information on how to use the product if the la-
bel contained warnings in Spanish concerning the flammability of the product." Id. at 1573.
103. The campaign included Hispanic advertising and customer-relations services of the
retail store, Home Depot. "Home Depot regularly and actively advertised in the Miami market on
Hispanic television, on four different Hispanic radio stations and in Diario Las Americas, a
Spanish language newspaper.... Home Depot also employed a translator service to convert
English instructions to Spanish for several of its product lines, including between forty and
seventy products, which it marketed with bilingual instructions." Id. at 1573. In fact, three
weeks before the fire at issue in Stanley Industries, the store had placed an ad to promote the oil
in Diario Las Americas. Id.
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lation.104 Stanley, the employer, claimed the warning was inadequate
for its Spanish-speaking employees; the manufacturer and retailer re-
sponded that a warning in English was sufficient as a matter of law
and moved for summary judgment. Denying the motion, the district
court analogized to both Hubbard-Hall and Campos.
First, the court noted that, as in Hubbard-Hall, the manufac-
turer should have foreseen its product would be used by non-English-
speaking persons because of its marketing efforts to Latino customers
and the nature of its product.1°5 Second, as in Campos, the court con-
cluded that this foresight made English-only warnings inadequate. 16
Stanley Industries, therefore, established a new proposition in the law:
When a product manufacturer uses non-English-language media to
reach non-English-speaking consumers, the manufacturer cannot
insist that product warnings in English are sufficient as a matter of
law.107 This rule, of course, is not as strong as finding English-only
warnings inadequate as a matter of law when the manufacturer tar-
gets non-English-speaking consumers because a jury's determination
lies between Stanley Industries and strict liability. Thus, Stanley
Industries raises as many questions as it answers,08 and represents
an important but incomplete step toward striking a proper balance
between the interests of non-English-speaking Americans and compet-
ing product manufacturers.
104. More than 38% of the Miami and Fort Lauderdale, Florida, metropolitan area speaks a
language other than English at home. 1990 Census at CPH 1990-5-17 (cited in note 2). At
1,239,849 people, that is enough to make Hispanic south Florida the 34th most populous state in
the nation. Id. at CPH 1990.5-1-2.
105. "In light of defendants' joint advertising in Miami's Hispanic media and the nature of
this product, this court likewise finds that it is for the jury to decide whether the defendant could
have reasonably foreseen that the boiled linseed oil would be used by persons such as Nicaraguan,
Spanish-speaking unskilled laborers." Stanley Industries, 784 F. Supp. at 1576 (citing Hubbard-
Hall, 340 F.2d at 405).
106. "It is uncontested that a large portion of the unskilled or semi-skilled Miami workforce
is comprised of foreign nationals whose native tongue is not English. Noting defendants'
targeting of the Hispanic population through the Hispanic media, this court believes that is for
the jury to decide whether a warning should at least contain universally accepted cautionary
symbols.' Stanley Industries, 784 F. Supp. at 1576 (citing Campos, 485 A.2d at 310).
107. Stanley Industries, 784 F. Supp. at 1576 (discussing the duty to warn a "pervasive
presence of foreign-tongued individuals").
108. For example, what if the community has a "pervasive presence" of non-English-speaking
citizens, but no non-English-language media? Is the advertising a necessary-or even suffi-
cient-component of the finding? Slightly more than 27,000 Floridians speak Polish at home, less
than two-tenths of one percent of the state's population. 1990 Census of Population and Housing
Summary Tape File 3C. Would an advertisement in a Florida-based Polish-language newsletter
give rise to the Stanley Industries doctrine? The answer is unclear.
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3. About Face: Ramirez v. Plough and the Influence of Federal
Regulations
The most recent opinion in this area, Ramirez v. Plough, Inc.,1°s
comes from the most influential court to consider the question, the
California Supreme Court. Through its result, Ramirez rejects the
approach taken by Hubbard-Hall, Campos, and Stanley Industries by
holding that English-only warnings can be sufficient as a matter of
law. 10 Ramirez, however, potentially opens new doors to non-English-
speaking plaintiffs. Because the scope of Ramirez is admittedly nar-
row, and it employs an analysis normally rejected in tort law, the case
demands careful analysis.
Jorge Ramirez, a four-month-old infant, ingested children's
aspirin administered by his mother when he had cold symptoms. The
aspirin bore a government-mandated warning"' that Reye's
Syndrome, a potentially fatal condition in children, had been linked to
the ingestion of aspirin during recovery from flu-like symptoms. 12
Jorge's mother, a Mexican native who was literate only in Spanish,
could not read the warnings." 3 After ingesting the children's aspirin,
Jorge developed Reye's Syndrome." 4
In Jorge's suit alleging failure to warn under California's strict
products liability doctrine, 1 5 the trial court granted the manufac-
turer's motion for summary judgment, holding that the pharmaceuti-
cal company had no duty to warn in a foreign language. A state ap-
peals court, however, reversed, citing Stanley Industries at length and
109. 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 863 P.2d 167 (1993).
110. Ramirez, 863 P.2d at 178.
111. See 51 Fed. Reg. 8,180 (March 7, 1986) (ordering Reye's Syndrome warning labels on
aspirin bottles for a two-year period). The Food and Drug Administration made the requirement
permanent in 1988. 53 Fed. Reg. 21,633 (June 9, 1988). The warning read: "Warning: Reye
Syndrome is a rare but serious disease which can follow flu or chicken pox in children and
teenagers. While the cause of Reye Syndrome is unknown, some reports claim aspirin may
increase the risk of developing this disease. Consult doctor before use in children or teenagers
with flu or chicken pox." Ramirez, 863 P.2d at 169.
112. Ramirez, 863 P.2d at 169.
113. After administering three tablets, Jorge's mother took him to a doctor, who advised her
to give Jorge nonaspiin over-the-counter medicines. Nonetheless, she continued to administer
the aspirin, which had been recommended by a friend. Id. at 169-70. The doctor apparently did
not warn her of Reye's Syndrome. Further, Jorge's mother asked no one to translate the English
bottle warnings into Spanish. Id. at 169.
114. As a result of Reye's Syndrome, Jorge developed "severe neurological damage, including
cortical blindness, spastic quadriplegia, and mental retardation." Id.
115. See Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 528, 810 P.2d 549, 553-
58 (1991).
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accepting its rationale, noting the manufacturer's advertisements in
local Latino media.116
The California Supreme Court reversed the appeals court,
limiting Ramirez to nonprescription drug labels," 7  a boundary
necessitated by the court's analysis. Grounding its holding in self-
described judicial restraint,118 the court relied on state"19 and federall o
drug regulations to define the standard of adequate warnings under
California products liability law.12 Acknowledging that statutes gen-
erally set floors, not standards, for conduct under tort law, 122 the
Ramirez court did otherwise, reasoning that a statute tailored to
address the particular conduct in question could act as a proxy for a
judicial assessment of tort duty.123 The California and federal statutes
to which Ramirez cited make no mention of English as the only lan-
guage in which a drug manufacturer may have to warn consumers.
Furthermore, Ramirez did not attempt to demonstrate the statutes
even contemplated English-only warnings, except by a kind of ex-
116. Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423, 426-31 (Cal. App. 1992). The appeals court
decision was analyzed and rejected in favor of a complicated, multifactor judicial balancing test
proposed in a Note published before the Supreme Court's Ramirez decision. Kelly Cox, Note, The
Duty to Warn: Should California Extend the Duty to Include Foreign Language Warnings?, 1 San
Diego Just. J. 517 (1993).
117. Ramirez, 863 P.2d at 171 n.3.
118. The same court that imposed strict products liability by judicial fiat 30 years earlier in
Greenman v. Yuba Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963), said that imposing a duty to warn
in a language other than English is "a task for which legislative and administrative bodies are
particularly well-suited." Ramirez, 863 P.2d at 174.
119. Cal. Health and Safety Code § 25900 (West 1984) (requiring English warning labels on
'dangerous drugs, poisons, and other harmful substances.").
120. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 352, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 352 et seq. (requiring
adequate labels and directions on nonprescription drugs); 21 C.F.R. § 201.15(c)(1) (1993)
(requiring English labels on nonprescription drugs except those drugs "distributed solely in...
Puerto Rico or in a Territory where the predominant language is one other than English").
121. Ramirez, 863 P.2d at 177.
122. 'Where a statute, ordinance or regulation is found to define a standard of conduct for
the purposes of negligence actions .... the standard defined is normally a minimum standard ....
This legislative or administrative minimum does not prevent a finding that a reasonable [person]
would have taken additional precautions where the situation is such as to call for them."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288C cmt. a (1965).
Not even pro-defendant products liability legislation working its way through Congress
agrees with Ramirez's use of the federal regulatory scheme to provide liability immunity. Section
203 of the Product Liability Fairness Act, approved by a Senate committee in late 1993, goes no
further than limiting punitive damages for makers of drugs regulated by the Food and Drug
Administration and aircraft components regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration.
Product Liability Fairness Act S.687 Report of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, [CCH Special 1] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 39-48 (Dec. 27, 1993).
123. 'Where the evidence shows no unusual circumstances, but only the ordinary situation
contemplated by the statute or administrative rule, then 'the minimum standard prescribed by
the legislation or regulation may be accepted by the triers of fact, or by the court as a matter of
law, as sufficient for the occasion .... " Ramirez, 863 P.2d at 172 (quoting Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 288C cmt. a (1965)).
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pressio unius argument that followed a list of language-specific stat-
utes in other areas of California law.124
Ramirez's insistence on drawing these significant inferences
from the legislative silence is unpersuasive for three reasons. First, it
is shaky statutory interpretation, given the broad range of legislative
possibilities, to presume that legislative inaction has any meaning at
all, much less the strong signal Ramirez says it sends.125 Second,
Ramirez virtually admits it mischaracterizes the legislature's silence
by predicting legislative response to its holding. 126 If the legislature
had chosen deliberately to follow the path Ramirez identifies, why
would the supreme court presume its holding would generate prompt
reaction in the statehouse? Finally, in pledging fealty to judicial
restraint, Ramirez betrays the law. It ignores the requirement that a
product warning be adequate as to the foreseeable user. Although
judicial restraint may urge courts to refrain from creating law, it
certainly does not contemplate substituting one doctrine for another
when its purpose is to avoid a difficult result. That behavior is simply
judicial activism.
127
The California Supreme Court's decision in Ramirez also re-
jects the emphasis on Spanish advertisingl2s adopted by both the ap-
124. "These statutes demonstrate that the Legislature is able and willing to define the
circumstances in which foreign-language communications should be mandated.... [We think it
reasonable to infer that the Legislature has deliberately chosen not to require that manufacturers
also include warnings in foreign languages. The same inference is warranted on the federal
level." Ramirez, 863 P.2d at 175.
125. "There could hardly be less reputable legislative material than legislative silence." Reed
Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes 181-82 (Little Brown, 1975). Further,
given the Hubbard-HalllCamposlStanley Industries line of cases and the prevailing definition of
"adequate warnings" in California, as embodied in California Basic Jury Instructions No. 9.20, an
assertion that the California legislature was acquiescing to a policy requiring warnings in
languages other than English is equally plausible.
126. "Indeed, we are conscious that our decision here may prompt review of this issue by the
California Legislature. That is as it should be...." Ramirez, 863 P.2d at 176.
127. The court's transparent activism makes the Ramirez conclusion, sounding in remorseful
judicial impotence, difficult to read:
We recognize that if a Spanish language warning had accompanied defendant's product,
and if plaintiffs mother had read and heeded the warning, the tragic blighting of a young
and innocent life that occurred in this case might not have occurred. Yet, as one court has
aptly commented, 'The extent to which special consideration should be given to persons
who have difficulty with the English language is a matter of public policy for consideration
by the appropriate legislative bodies and not by the Courts."
Id. at 178 (quoting Carmona v. Sheffield, 325 F. Supp. 1341, 1342 (N.D. Cal. 1971)).
128. Noting that the California legislature had passed other statutes requiring businesses
that advertise in languages other than English to deal with their customers in those same
languages, the Ramirez court said their presence "only underscores the point that the Legislature
... [is] able to provide the appropriate forum to consider the arguments for multilingual warn-
ings." Ramirez, 863 P.2d at 177. See also id. at 174-75 (listing statutes).
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peals court and the Stanley Industries court.12 9 On this narrow point,
however, Ramirez appears to offer non-English-speaking plaintiffs a
new opportunity for relief. The court opened the possibility of tort
liability premised on the content of foreign-language advertising when
the advertising assumes this information-spreading function of the
warning.1 30 Justice Mosk stressed the issue in his concurrence, sug-
gesting that the warning function could be served by a variety of me-
dia.131 Under Justice Mosk's view, an absence of warnings in a manu-
facturer's non-English advertising could amount to misrepresentation
of a product's safety.132 The court's decisions contain no evidence that
the entire California Supreme Court would adopt Justice Mosk's view
or that any other court would reshape the duty to warn in such a
radical fashion.
IV. PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT OF NON-ENGLISH-SPEAKING MARKETS:
THE STATUTORY SOLUTION
The risks of developing a standard directly from either Ramirez
or the Hub bard-Hall/CamposIStanley Industries line of cases are
great. Neither approach properly balances the consumer interests
advanced by warning requirements against the legitimate economic
interests of product manufacturers faced with rapidly changing con-
sumer demographics. This Part outlines the risks of maintaining the
current system and demonstrates why a statutory solution based on
the jurisdictional doctrine of purposeful availment, a doctrine with its
origin in products liability cases, strikes the proper balance.
129. Ramirez, 863 P.2d at 176-77. The court appeared to interpret Ramirez's advertising
argument as a contractual claim, sounding in reliance. "[Pllaintiffs mother could not have relied
upon defendant's advertising because she admittedly did not see it or hear it." Id. at 177.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 179 (Mosk, J., concurring).
132. Id.
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A. Risky Business: The Current Approaches
1. Effect on Manufacturers
a. Lack of Constitutional Safeguards
One of the most interesting common aspects of Ramirez and
Stanley Industries is their similar treatment of their state constitu-
tions' English-language provisions. English is the official language of
both California and Florida.3 3  Neither Ramirez nor Stanley
Industries, however, even mentioned their state constitutions. The
California Appeals Court indirectly addressed this issue in Ramirez
when it stated that despite legislative or judicial recognition of
English as an official language, manufacturers are not neccessarily
protected from liability if they provide a warning written only in
English.13 These cases suggest that manufacturers are unlikely to
find refuge in state or federal English-only provisions. 131 Although
some state constitutions specifically authorize lawsuits against the
government to enforce the official status of English, no court has held
that these provisions provide a defense against a cause of action
brought by a private party.36
b. Unpredictability of Jury Verdicts and Costs of Doing Business
Stanley Industries, like much of today's products liability law,
poses an even greater problem for manufacturers by exposing product
sellers to the vagaries of the jury system. The uncertainty of jury
determinations forces manufacturers to insure against the possibility
of the most severe injuries. 137 Although many scholars and legislators
have debated the extent to which liability insurance cost increases are
133. Cal. Const. Art. III, § 6(b); Fla. Const. Art. II, § 9.
134. "While the constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and judicial authorities ... may reflect
a public policy recognizing the status of English as an official language, nothing compels the
conclusion that a manufacturer of a dangerous or defective product is immunized from liability
when an English-only warning does not adequately inform non-English literate persons likely to
use the product." Ramirez, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 428.
135. See notes 67 and 83 and accompanying text.
136. See, for example, Cal. Const. Art. III, § 6(d). Arizona's provision establishing English as
the State's official language prohibited any arm of state government, including the courts, from
making or enforcing "any law, order, decree or policy which requires the use of a language other
than English." The entire provision was declared unconstitutional, however. See note 67.
137. W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability 132-156 (Harvard, 1991) (arguing that
expansion of warning-defect liability has been one of the primary causes in the increase in
products liability-associated costs to manufacturers).
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the result of expanded tort liability, the effect on even careful manu-
facturers is significant as premiums rise across industries. 8
Additionally, a nebulously defined duty to warn in languages other
than English may impose significant product-design and packaging
costs. '3 9 The Census Bureau counts 299 different languages spoken by
Americans.'14 In how many languages is the manufacturer obligated
to warn? An amicus brief filed in Ramirez identified the issue, stating
that encouraging manufacturers to "protect themselves" by listing
warnings in a variety of ways would be not only overly burdensome to
the manufacturer but ultimately costly to the consumer.14'
c. Ramirez's Inherent Limits
Although Ramirez is essentially pro-manufacturer, the court
notably limited its holding to nonprescription drugs;'4 absent a
similar regulatory scheme, other manufacturers have no reason to
believe Ramirez will shelter them. These manufacturers find
themselves in a position that is just as unpredictable as the positions
of product sellers in jurisdictions that have yet to consider the duty-to-
warn question. The fact that Stanley Industries borrows many of its
concepts from the duty-to-warn doctrines accepted in most
138. See, for example, Uniform Federal Product Liability Law Hearings on S. 640 Before the
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 21-26 (1992) (containing
testimony of Stuart M. Gerson, assistant attorney general); Product Liability Fairness Act S.687
Report of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, [CCH Special 1] Prod.
Liab. Rep. (CCH) 5-6 (Dec. 27, 1993). See also Omer Lee Reed and John L. Watkins, Product
Liability Tort Reform: The Case for Federal Action, 63 Neb. L. Rev. 389, 436-46 (1984).
139. Two courts have wrestled with the legal problems posed by warning adequacy require-
ments and a lack of available product space for a warning. See Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Products
Co., 840 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988) and Broussard v. Continental Oil Co., 433 S.2d 354, 358(La.
App.), cert. denied, 440 S.2d 726 (La. 1983). Both courts tried to draw a factual distinction
between warnings accompanying small and large products without further clarifying what "small"
and 'large" meant. Professor Jacobs harshly criticizes these courts for only adding to the
adequacy confusion. He proposes that juries determine warning adequacy based on the
decisionmaking process of the manufacturer, given the manufacturer's knowledge of its products'
foreseeable users. Under his theory, a warning would be adequate based on the decisionmaking
process a reasonable manufacturer in the position of the defendant would have entertained.
Jacobs, 71 N.C. L. Rev. at 143-45 (cited in note 5). By focusing on the process of commercial
decision-making, however, Professor Jacobs would devalue consumer safety, one of the principle
tenets of products liability law. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. (1) (1965).
140. 1990 Census, Tape File 3C (cited in note 2).
141. "[A] manufacturer . . . would be obliged to supply a veritable tome of warnings with
every box, can or bottle that contained a warning-an enormous, if not impossible task.
Sanctioning such liability would place a severe and onerous burden on the manufacturing
community, a burden that inevitably would be borne by consumers in the form of higher product
costs." Amicus brief of the Cosmetic, Toiletry, and Fragrance Association and the Product
Liability Advisory Council, Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 863 P.2d 167 (1993)
(quoted in Mike McKee, The Liabilities of Language, The Recorder 1 (April 9, 1993)).
142. See text accompanying notes 117-21.
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jurisdictions, however, indicates that most manufacturers face
Stanley-type uncertainty'" in any state with non-English-speaking
citizens, that is, every state.
2. Effect on Non-English-Speaking Plaintiffs
a. Lack of Remedies for Injuries Due to Failure to Warn
Adequately
Ramirez, of course, offers little relief to people who speak
languages other than English. Although that opinion is premised on
the pervasive regulation of nonprescription drugs, Ramirez's general
theme of legislative deference in this area could work equally well
throughout the products liability regime.1" Furthermore, Ramirez not
only deprives non-English-speaking plaintiffs of the opportunity to
recover for their injuries,1 45 it permits manufacturers to market defec-
tive products'" to the non-English-speaking population, a segment of
American society whose rapid growth is reflected in its increased
purchasing power.' 47
b. Potential for Jury Bias Against Non-English-Speaking
Plaintiffs
Stanley Industries' jury-question approach also creates signifi-
cant difficulties for non-English-speaking plaintiffs. State laws rou-
tinely exclude non-English-speaking citizens from jury participation. 1
As a result, many Americans, including those most likely to identify
143. See Jacobs, 71 N.C. L. Rev. at 157-58 (cited in note 5).
144. "Defining the circumstances under which warnings or other information should be
provided in a language other than English is a task for which legislative and administrative
bodies are particularly well suited." Ramirez, 863 P.2d at 174. See also note 127.
145. Following the California Supreme Court's Ramirez decision, Rosa Rivera, Jorge's
mother, stated, "This is a failure of justice." Claire Cooper, Drug Firm Not Liable for Lack of
Spanish Warning, Court Says, Sacramento Bee A12 (Dec. 10, 1993).
146. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. j (1965).
147. Latinos spent $180 billion on goods and services in 1992. By one estimate, non-
Caucasian minorities may account for 30% of the U.S. economy by the year 2000. Thomas
McCarroll, It's a Mass Market No More, Time, Special Issue: The New Face of America 80, 80-81
(Fall 1993). Latino purchasing power is reported to have doubled in the last decade. Debra Cano,
Culture Cash; Upscale Central Stores Make It Easy for Latinos to Exercise Their Spending Power,
L.A. Times D1 (Feb. 10, 1994).
148. See, for example, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 16-31-102(a)(3) (1993); Ala. Code. § 12-16-59(b)(3)
(1993); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9.9-1.1 (Supp. 1992) (English proficiency necessary "to understand and
participate in the court proceedings"); State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542, 798 P.2d 1 (1990) (upholding an
English proficiency requirement for jurors).
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closely with a non-English-speaking plaintiff, are excluded from jury
service.14
Further diminishing the opportunity of a non-English-literate
plaintiff to have a jury drawn from "a fair cross section of the commu-
nity," 5 the Supreme Court held in Hernandez v. New York 51 that
prosecutors may peremptorily strike bilingual jurors if non-English
testimony will be presented during trial. In Hernandez, the Court
permitted peremptory strikes of two Latino bilingual jurors on the
ground that the Latinos could substitute their own understanding of
Spanish-language testimony for the official court interpreter's ver-
sion. 152 Rejecting the argument that language is closely correlated to
race in the Latino community,'5 the Court held the Latino strikes
were constitutionally race-neutral.154
Because of the Hernandez case and state-law English-profi-
ciency requirements, a non-English-speaking plaintiff likely must try
her duty-to-warn case in front of a jury comprised entirely of persons
who speak only English. 155 In a contract dispute or criminal trial, this
may be of varying importance to the non-English-speaking party. In a
149. Recent scholarship argues that juries failing to represent the community undermine
public confidence in the judicial process. See Nancy King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or
Cure? A Contemporary Review and Analysis of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 69 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 707 (1994) (manuscript on file with author); Juan F. Perea, Hernandez v. New York: Courts,
Prosecutors, and the Fear of Spanish, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 55-58 (1992); Ramirez, 1993 Wis. L.
Rev. at 798-801 (cited in note 8).
150. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975).
151. 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
152. Court interpreters are not rare. In 1986, federal district courts used court interpreters
more than 45,000 times. Susan Berk-Seligson, The Bilingual Courtroom: Court Interpreters in
the Judicial Process 5 (U. of Chicago, 1990). For a discussion of the problems raised by the use of
court interpreters, see generally Michael B. Shulman, Note, No Hablo Ingles: Court
Interpretation as a Major Obstacle to Fairness for Non-English Speaking Defendants, 46 Vand. L.
Rev. 175 (1993).
153. Noting that 75% of Latinos speak Spanish, Professor Ramirez argues that "super-
correlated" racial traits merit the same strict constitutional scrutiny as race itself. Ramirez, 1993
Wis. L. Rev. at 762-64 & nn. 5, 8 (cited in note 8). The trial court in Pemberthy v. Beyer, 800 F.
Supp. 144, 160 (D. N.J. 1992) rev'd, 62 U.S.L.W. 2601 (3rd Cir. 1994), agreed, holding that
"Spanish-speaking ability bears such a close relationship to a juror's identity as a Latino that it is
a surrogate for race and/or ethnicity." The Third Circuit rejected the super-correlation theory,
however, asserting that 'linguistic ability is not immutable" and that discrimination against non-
English-speaking persons "is not comparable to the history of discrimination based on... race or
national origin." Pemberthy, 62 U.S.L.W. at 2601.
154. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1867. The race-neutral requirement emerged from Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), in which the Court held that peremptory strikes based on the race
of the juror violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court extended Batson's prohibitions to civil cases in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614 (1991). Under Batson, once a party makes a prima facie showing that a juror was
peremptorily excluded because of the juror's race, the opposing party must come forward with a
race-neutral explanation for the strike. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
155. Ramirez, 1993 Wis, L. Rev. at 801-06 (cited in note 8).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
proceeding in which language differences lie at the core of the case,
however, a linguistically skewed jury presents a real threat to the
non-English-speaking plaintiffs case. Although studies have found
conflicting evidence that minority presence on juries alters results,'5
no one reasonably could doubt Justice Thurgood Marshall's warning of
the potential for damage to justice when a large and identifiable seg-
ment of the community is barred from jury service . 7
B. Purposeful Availment and Non-English-Speaking Markets
The failure of the law to account properly for the different
interests implicated by the duty-to-warn doctrine,' the economic
concerns of manufacturers, and the growing non-English-speaking
consumer population compels a new approach. The challenge is three-
fold: satisfy the purposes behind the adequate warning requirement,
offer manufacturers greater liability predictability to facilitate eco-
nomic planning and efficiency, and protect a large and growing seg-
ment of the American people from defective products. Fortunately,
the answer is already available in products liability law, although it
masquerades as a procedural, rather than substantive, guarantee. It
is time, however, to replicate the purposeful availment doctrine from
the world of civil procedure and place it into the substantive body of
duty-to-warn law.
Purposeful availment was applied first to products liability in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson, 59 a 1980 personal
jurisdiction case in which the Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause would not permit a New York resident to bring a
products liability action in Oklahoma against a New York automobile
distributor for injuries that occurred in Oklahoma. In World-Wide
Volkswagen, a New York auto distributor with a Northeast market
base sold an Audi through a New York dealer to a family who later
moved from New York. On the drive to their new home, the family
156. Richard Lacayo, Whose Peers?, Time, Special Issue: The Changing Face of America 60,
60 (Fall 1993).
157. "[Ihe effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of
human experience.... It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently
vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective
on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented."
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972). See Perea, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. at 58 (cited in note 149).
158. See notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
159. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In fact, purposeful availment was first elucidated in Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (involving the application of state estate trust laws), though
some commentators maintain Hanson was largely ignored by lower courts. Howard Stravitz,




was in a serious accident in Oklahoma and sued several parties, in-
cluding the dealer and distributor, in rural Oklahoma. Covertly ac-
knowledging that the minimum contacts test of International Shoe
Company v. Washington'60 would authorize Oklahoma jurisdiction
because it might be foreseeable that a car sold in New York could end
up in Oklahoma, the Court demanded more. It held that the defini-
tion of foreseeability for jurisdictional purposes in a products liability
action is whether a defendant reasonably should anticipate being
haled into court in that jurisdiction. 16' In language especially relevant
to the focus of this Note, the Court added that when a manufacturer
or distributor purposefully markets its products in a state, subjecting
that manufacturer or distributor to suit in that state is not unreason-
able.6
2
Seven years later in Asahi Metal Industry Company v. Superior
Court of California, Solano County,163 the Court refined World-Wide
Volkswagen's purposeful availment requirement to be met only when
a defendant purposefully directed its actions toward the forum state. 64
The Court further explained what it meant by "purposefully directed"
in a commercial context, defining it as conduct of a party indicating
that it has an intent to serve a market in the forum state. 6 5 This
conduct, according to the Court, could include designing a product
specifically for the market, advertising in the market, and
establishing distribution or customer-service channels for the
market.' 66
World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi, as well as the lower court
decisions following them, 67 are based on the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. A fundamental tenet of these
160. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
161. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
162. "Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor ... is not simply an
isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve,
directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject
it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of
injury to its owner or to others." Id.
163. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
164. Id. at 112.
165. [Clonduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in
the forum State, for example, designing the product for the market .... advertising.... establish-
ing channels for providing regular advice to customers .... or marketing the product through a
distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State." Id.
166. Id.
167. See, for example, Batton v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. Co., 153 Ariz. 268, 736 P.2d
2, 5 (1987); Szalay v. Handcock, 307 Ark. 232, 819 S.W.2d 684, 687 (1991); Georgia Insurers
Insolvency Pool v. Brewer, 602 S.2d 1264, 1268 (Fla. 1992); Wiles v. Morita Iron Works Co., Ltd.,
125 M. 2d 144, 530 N.E.2d 1382, 1385 (1988); Chace v. Dorcy Int'l, Inc., 68 Ohio App. 3d 99, 587
N.E.2d 442, 446 (1991).
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amendments is that individuals deserve notice of the means by which
the state intends to deprive them of life, liberty, or property. 1 8 While
the Due Process Clause does not eliminate all uncertainty and not all
law is constitutionally derived, a value sufficiently central to our legal
system to merit inclusion in the Constitution-in this case, no-
tice-equally merits a place of prominence in the development of tort
and contract law.
The principles of World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi should
inform the development of products liability warning law for non-
English-speaking plaintiffs. A fundamental objection of manufactur-
ers to a multilanguage warning requirement is the fear that anyone
who speaks one of the hundreds of languages spoken in America may
have a cause of action in strict liability. Manufacturers claim they
cannot package their products to guard against this uncertainty. 1 9 A
requirement that a manufacturer face liability only if it has purpose-
fully availed itself of non-English-language markets should alleviate
those fears. As in personal jurisdiction, placing this requirement in
products liability law would provide more predictability, allowing
potential defendants to structure their conduct appropriately.170
The Asahi plurality's test,17' which puts a manufacturer on
notice that it is open to suit in a foreign jurisdiction, also should put a
manufacturer on notice of liability for failure to warn in a foreign
language. Under Justice O'Connor's test, manufacturers' product
design, advertising,172 marketing, and distribution decisions would
affect their products liability in ways they could reasonably predict.1
73
168. "That a man is entitled to some notice before he can be deprived of his liberty or
property, is an axiom of the law to which no citation of authority would give additional weight."
Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 409 (1900). See also Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 314 (1950).
169. See notes 138-39 and accompanying text. Professor Jacobs agrees that current products
liability law is ill-equipped to handle what he calls "linguistic-adequacy exceptions." Jacobs, 71
N.C. L. Rev. at 155 (cited in note 5). He asserts that requiring manufacturers to gear their
warnings to consumers of different race, age, and gender would force the exceptions to overtake
the adequacy rule, offering manufacturers arguably less guidance about warning adequacy than
they have today. But see cases cited in note 40. Professor Jacobs is justified in his concern. The
doctrine advanced in text accompanying notes 167-74 avoids the problems he foresees.
170. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
171. See note 165.
172. Advertising in languages other than English has become big business in the United
States. Proctor & Gamble spends about $100 million annually on "ethnic-oriented ads," including
sponsorship of Hablando, a half-hour morning program on one of the United States' Spanish-
language television networks. AT&T runs U.S. broadcast and print ads in twenty different
languages, including Korean, Tagalog, and the West African dialect, Twi. Liquor distillers R4my
Martin and Courvoisier run ads in Chinese-language newspapers and magazines. McCarroll,
Time Special Edition at 80-81 (cited in note 147).
173. Purposeful availment answers the criticism of Professor Jacobs, who fears that courts
are otherwise unable to "halt the momentum... short of requiring that manufacturers blanket
their products with as many separate warnings as there are linguistically significant groups."
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Manufacturers could choose whether to enter non-English-speaking
markets and meet the warning requirements of the law. These kinds
of market-sensitive decisions are not foreign to manufacturers, who
make them regularly.114  Purposeful availment simply would allow
them to weigh risks and calculate the costs of doing business in non-
English-speaking markets more accurately.
175
By narrowing the set of potentially liable parties, a purposeful
availment requirement, standing by itself, may be said to work
against the interests of thirty-one million non-English-speaking
Americans. An appropriate balance, therefore, is to subject manufac-
turers to liability, as a matter of law, when they purposefully avail
themselves of non-English-speaking markets and then fail to warn in
those markets in the language consumers speak. This rule would
adequately protect the deterrence and compensation roles of tort law;
manufacturers would be deterred from placing unsafe products in
commercially desirable non-English-speaking markets, and consumers
would be compensated for their injuries in a way that would spread
the costs of compensation among only those manufacturers who fail to
warn in appropriate languages. Making the determination of a warn-
ing's adequacy as to a non-English-literate plaintiff a matter of law,
rather than fact, also guards against the jury discrimination issues
raised by state English-language laws and the Supreme Court's
Hernandez holding.176
Applying the purposeful availment test to Stanley Industries
and Ramirez illustrates the issues that would arise. In Stanley
Jacobs, 71 N.C. L. Rev. at 153 (cited in note 5). In areas with non-English markets of size
sufficiently significant to attract product sellers and to give rise to the purposeful availment
doctrine, Jacobs's concerns that multilingual warnings "might intimidate or confuse consumers,
causing them to ignore all of the risk information," id. at 154, do not ring true. Residents of these
communities already live in a multilingual culture. Cathy Booth, Miami: The Capital of Latin
America, Time, Special Issue: The New Face of America 82 (Fall 1993). A change in product
packaging requirements would, therefore, produce changes only at the societal margin.
174. Marketers searching for ways to connect with the Spanish-speaking market in the
United States employ a variety of tactics. A high-dollar department store in Los Angeles hires
Spanish-speaking sales clerks and displays store signs in languages other than English. Cano,
L.A. Times at D-1 (cited in note 146). A Maryland auto dealership advertises on a local Spanish-
language cable channel and has a Spanish-speaking sales staff. Northern Virginia dealerships
promote their Spanish-speaking staff in local Spanish-language newspapers. Lisa Leff, The Art of
the Deal-in Spanish; Car Dealerships Using Hispanic Salespeople to Pull in Customers, Wash.
Post B1 (Feb. 5, 1994). Latino advertising agencies develop ads specifically for Latino purchasers
and help Anglo clients place their ads in non-English media. Pat Baldwin, Hispanic Ad Agency
Expanding in Size and Scope, Dallas Morning News 2F (Jan. 15, 1994).
175. Removing the liability uncertainty in non-English failure-to-warn cases ought to keep
insurance rates and legal transaction costs lower for those manufacturers who properly warn
their customers of product dangers. See notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
176. See notes 150-157 and accompanying text.
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Industries, the warnings on the container of linseed oil contained only
English-language warnings. The manufacturer and retailer, however,
engaged in a joint effort to promote the linseed oil and other products
on Spanish radio, television, and newspapers in the south Florida
media market. The retailer also printed instructions for many of its
products in Spanish and provided Spanish-language customer assis-
tance.1 77 Measuring the defendants' actions, against the purposeful
availment factors-advertising, establishing channels for providing
regular service to customers, and marketing the product through a
distributor who has agreed to serve as an agent for the manufacturer
to Spanish-speaking customers-indicates that, under purposeful
availment, the linseed oil warnings in Stanley Industries clearly would
be inadequate as a matter of law.
A similar result would occur under the Ramirez facts, given
Plough's Spanish-language advertising. A judge may want to know
other facts, however, before ruling that the warning is inadequate,
including whether Plough had established a toll-free Spanish-lan-
guage customer service number, or, acting on its marketing find-
ings,178 entered into agreements with distributors or retail outlets that
specialize in reaching Latino markets. In either case, a finding of
warning inadequacy still would require a fact-finder to determine
whether the inadequate warning actually caused a plaintiffs inju-
ries 179 and what damages resulted. These issues, which are relatively
language-neutral, likely would be less susceptible to bias by monolin-
gual panels than the determination of an English warning's adequacy.
Ramirez is correct in stating that a change of this magnitude in
the law is best made by legislatures. 80 As Ramirez noted, state legis-
latures throughout the country have demonstrated that they are will-
ing and able to determine when manufacturers and sellers must
communicate warnings in a foreign language.,8' Given the demo-
graphics of legislatures versus state benches, 182 the odds are better
177. See notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
178. Plough, Inc., found in an internal marketing study that sales of St. Joseph Aspirin for
Children, the nonprescription drug at issue in Ramirez, were twice as high in predominantly
Latino neighborhoods as in Anglo stores. McKee, The Recorder at 1 (April 9, 1993) (cited in note
140).
179. Both cases were reported at the summary judgment stage. Ramirez's holding settled
the California case as a matter of law.
180. Ramirez, 863 P.2d at 178.
181. Id. at 177. For examples, see notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
182. In Cook County, Illinois, where 9.5% of the population is Latino, only one Latino judge
served among 177 judges on the circuit court level in 1990. Richard Saks, Note, Redemption or
Exemption?: Racial Discrimination in Judicial Elections Under the Voting Rights Act, 66 Chi.
Kent. L. Rev. 245, 246 n.4 (1990). A 1991 judicial redistricting law was expected to increase that
number to twenty-two. David Heckelman, Cook County Judicial Districts Approved, Chi. Daily L.
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that the proper result will come from the statehouse rather than the
state court. Further, although this Note's proposal is rooted in the
law and many of its longstanding concerns, the suggested solution
represents a series of value judgments traditionally left to electorally
responsive bodies.
V. CONCLUSION
That issues of multilingualism plague American law is not
surprising. After all, the common law originated in England. The
United States is not and has not been a part of England for well over
two hundred years, however. In the spirit of our own immigrant
story, American law should reflect its English heritage but should not
be mired in it.
As a shared cultural experience, widespread use of English has
helped the United States form into a more cohesive nation.
Immigrants historically brought few resources more valuable than a
gift of languages that enriched our peculiar brand of English with new
phrases, ideas, and terms. Generally, they assimilated into this na-
tion by learning English because they had little choice if they were to
prosper in the marketplace and join in the "melting pot."
Today, the need to learn English no longer exists. Spanish-
speaking communities have developed to the point that, economically
speaking, they no longer need to speak English to succeed. Asian
communities, created in part by foreign investment and educational
opportunities in the United States, have attracted the sort of wealthy
immigrants that do not need to speak English to prosper.
Additionally, language today is viewed by many non-English-speaking
Americans as an expression of their own unique culture. 18 English
remains overwhelmingly the language of commerce, government, and
the arts. English, however, is no longer the only route to success.
Bull. 1 (July 2, 1991). As of February 1992, only 1.7 percent of New York State's 1,129 judges
were Latino. Shaun Assael, Only Their Robes Are Black, N.Y. Newsday 37 (Feb. 24, 1992). In
December 1993, New York Governor Mario Cuomo named the first Latino to serve on the state's
highest court. Gary Spencer, Ciparick Named to Court of Appeals; Supreme Court Justice Is First
Hispanic Nominee, N.Y. L. J. 1 (Dec. 2, 1993). Only eleven of Florida's 723 state judges are
Latino. Report and Recommendations of the Florida Supreme Court Racial and Ethnic Bias
Study Commission, 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 591, 613. The miniscule number of Latino judges, even
in heavily Latino states, creates bias problems similar to those presented by monolingual juries.
Id. at 611-12. See note 148.
183. See McKay and Wong, eds., Language Diversity at 109-292 (cited in note 6) (explaining
the "language situation" of several immigrant language minorities in the United States).
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Tort law, particularly products liability, is not about immigra-
tion policy, foreign relations, or language skills. It is about the promo-
tion of two critical goals: compensation for one's injuries and deter-
rence of future harm. In the pursuance of those goals, tort law should
not allow prejudice and bias to sanction a two-tiered system, in which
those who speak the "right" language are compensated for their harms
and those who profit from persons who speak the "wrong" language
are undeterred from selling them unsafe products.
To paraphrase Judge Cardozo, it is time to put the source of
the obligation to non-English-speaking Americans where it ought to
be. It is time to put its source in the law. Thomas H. Lee*
* Thanks are due Professor Nancy King for sharing her research findings on jury bias and
my wife, Laurie Lee, for her careful eye and patient soul. This Note is dedicated to Hayden
Turner Lee.
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